This paper tests the hypothesis that the extension of the voting franchise was caused by the threat of revolution, as suggested by Acemoglu and Robinson [Quarterly Journal of Economics 115, 1167Economics 115, -1199Economics 115, , 2000. We approximate the threat of revolution in a given country by revolutionary events happening in neighboring countries. We investigate the relationship between this new measure of the threat of revolution and measures of su¤rage reform in two samples of European countries covering the period from 1820 to 1938. We …nd strong support for the 'threat of revolution theory'. We also …nd some evidence that war triggered su¤rage reform, whereas other theories of the extension of the franchise, including 'modernization theory', receive little support.
Introduction
Why would the political elite of a country ever want to extend the voting franchise to broader segments of the population? After all, by doing so, it dilutes its own political base and exposes itself to the risk of redistribution. One answer to the challenge posed by this question is that the governing classes extend the franchise to avoid revolution or other forms of radical social transformation. 1 To be sure, there are many other ways to head o¤ a revolution, but, as Robinson (2000, 2006) point out in their seminal work on this question, voting rights have the advantage that once they are granted, they are hard to take back. 2 Accordingly, a franchise extension can serve as a commitment to future redistribution in cases where it would not be credible for the elite to redistribute while retaining power. Along similar lines, Conley and Temini (2001) argue that the extension of franchise occurs when the interests of the enfranchised and disenfranchised groups con ‡ict and the disenfranchised group presents a credible threat. Boix (2003) also views the threat of revolution as a process that strengthens the hand of the disenfranchised, but emphasizes the interaction with structural and organizational parameters that makes democracy cheap relative to autocracy rather than the commitment value of democracy.
The threat of revolution plays a central role in these arguments. The historical record provides justi…cation for this focus. For example, the work by Tilly (1995) suggests that contentious gatherings in Great Britain gained momentum in the period leading up to the critical vote on the Great Reform Act in the autumn of 1831 and when Lord Grey introduced the reform bill in Parliament earlier that year with the words 'the principal of my reform is to prevent the necessity of revolution[...] I am reforming to preserve, not to overthrow'he was making a clear reference to the perceived risk of violent and radical social change. Political historians, such as Lee (1994) , suggest that the threat of violence also played a key role in relation to the Second Reform Act in 1867. The perceived link between franchise extension and the threat of revolution is by no means unique to Britain. 1 See Tullock (1971) for a classical exposition of why revolutions happen. 2 For alternative theories of franchise extension, see Justman and Gradstein (1999) , Lizzeri and Persico (2004) , Llavador and Oxoby (2005) , Falkinger (1999) or Congleton (2004 Congleton ( , 2007 Congleton ( , 2011 . Jack and Laguno¤ (2006) formulate a general theory of dynamic enfranchisement that encompasses many of these competing theories.
For example, Tilton (1974) grants the threat of revolution a central role in the Swedish franchise reforms of 1866 and 1909, and, of course, the revolution of 1848 was a direct cause of subsequent franchise reform in France, as was the (unsuccessful) 1905 revolution in Russia.
It is, however, more di¢ cult to establish if the threat of revolution played a decisive role more generally when other potential causes of franchise reform are taken into account and yet more challenging to establish if any observed correlation between the threat of revolution and su¤rage reform represents a causal e¤ect or is just coincidental. A small literature has made some attempt at addressing these challenges. Kim (2007) argues that strike activity within a country can be used as a proxy for the threat of revolution and shows that various measures of strikes are correlated with franchise reforms in a sample of 12 western European countries between 1880 and World War II. Przeworski (2009) studies a broader sample of countries but his focus is on the period after the Great War. He uses data on demonstrations, riots, and strikes to proxy the threat and establishes a strong correlation between these measures and the probability of su¤rage reform.
In this paper, we propose a new measure of the threat of revolution. According to the 'threat of revolution theory'the political elites contemplating franchise reform needed to assess the likelihood of revolution in their country. To this end, they would obviously use information about the situation locally, e.g. about riots, strikes or other types of social unrest. But they would also observe what was happening elsewhere and use reports about revolutionary activities in neighboring countries to update their assessment of the likelihood of revolution at home. Based on this, they would then decide whether to relinquish power and to extend voting rights as a preemptive measure. Our proposed measure of the threat of revolution is based on this logic of international transmission of information.
Based on the work by Tilly (1993) and others, we have recorded all 'revolutionary events' in Europe during the period 1820 and 1938 and used this to construct new measures of the threat of revolution as it might have been perceived by the governing elites in di¤er-ent countries in the region at the time. The underlying logic suggests that the governing elites would learn more from revolutionary events 'closer to home'and we construct threat measures based on geographical and linguistic distance to the event.
Our approach has two major advantages that sets it apart from previous tests of the 'threat of revolution theory'. The …rst advantage is that our measure can, under two plausible conditions, be used to access the causal link, if any, between the threat of revolution and su¤rage reform. First, the governing elites in each country revised their assessment of the risk of a home-grown revolution upwards after observing revolutionary events in neighboring countries. As we discuss in section 3, there exists convincing historical evidence that the elites did in fact pay attention to revolutionary events as and when they happened abroad and that these played a pivotal role in decisions to extend the franchise. Second, by focusing on revolutionary events in the 'neighborhood'of a country and by excluding events that happened within a country itself, these events represent exogenous shocks to the information set of the elite. Our measure of the threat level is therefore unlikely to be correlated with other (observed and unobserved) determinants of su¤rage reform -such as political rivalry between factions within the national elites or general enlightenment trends -originating within that country. In contrast, threat measures based on 'national events' -in particular labor market unrest and riots -are likely to be endogenous to the political situation of the country in which they take place. In fact, one may conjecture that reform politics and local riots and strikes might be driven by the same largely unobserved political and economic factors. Accordingly, while Kim (2007) and Przeworski (2009) , on the basis of such measures, have uncovered a suggestive correlation between strikes and riots on the one hand, and su¤rage reform on the other, it remains unclear whether this represents a causal mechanism or not. 3 The second advantage of our approach is that we can quantify the threat for the critical period in the 19th and early 20th centuries during which the franchise was in fact extended in Europe. Due to data limitations previous work focused on the period after the Great War (Przeworski, 2009) or had 1880 as starting point (Kim, 2007 ). 4 Our data allow us to start the analysis in 1820 and thus to cover the period in 3 Kim (2007) , for example, does not take into account unobserved country or time …xed e¤ects when estimating the e¤ect of strikes on su¤rage reform. The estimated correlation could, therefore, represent unobserved political factors at the national level or international political shocks. 4 It is di¢ cult to reconstruct data on strikes for the 19th century. The earliest data are from France, Italy and Sweden and are recorded from the 1880s; data for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany and the European history during which the franchise was actually extended.
Using these new measures of the threat of revolution, we estimate two alternative models of franchise reform using two samples of European countries from 1820 to 1938.
We control for other potential determinants of democracy such as income, urbanization, education, war, trade integration, social learning etc. as well as for alternative strategies that the governing classes might have used to cope with the threat of revolution. The …rst model is a dynamic panel model with …xed country and time e¤ects. Here, the outcome variable is a measure of the number of voters as a proportion of the potential electorate.
The second model is an event history model. Here, we seek to explain the conditional probability of a franchise reform. Both models show that the threat of revolution was a major cause of franchise extension during the …rst wave of democratization in Europe.
This lends strong support to the 'threat of revolution theory'.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a model of franchise reform based on a simple extension of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) . In section 3, we present our data on revolutionary events and su¤rage reform. In section 4, we discuss issues related to identi…cation. In sections 5 and 6, we report the evidence on the 'threat of revolution theory'coming from the dynamic panel and the event history model, respectively. In section 7, we discuss evidence related to competing theories of franchise reform. In section 8, we conclude.
Theory
Our test of the 'threat of revolution theory'is based on the idea that revolutionary events abroad represent exogenous shocks to the information set of the elites in other countries and may, through that channel, be a trigger of su¤rage reform. International transmission of such information could work through a number of alternative channels.
One possibility is that the governing elites are unsure about whether a revolution is in the making or, if it is, about what the consequences of a revolution might be. In this case, UK are recorded from the 1890s and for other countries not until the 20th century. Thus, as documented below, many major franchise reforms are not covered by the sample studied by Kim (2007) . revolutionary events abroad o¤er an opportunity for the elites to learn from the experience of others and base their decision regarding political reform on that. To formalize this logic, we develop a simpli…ed version of the model of franchise extension presented by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000).
Assumptions
We consider a society with an in…nite time horizon, t = 0; 1; :::1. It is populated by two groups of individuals, the rich and the poor. The majority of the population is poor.
The political state (S P ol t ) of the society can be either democracy (D), autocracy (A), or a post-revolutionary regime (S), i.e., S P ol t 2 fD; A; Sg. Utility is linear in income and is discounted by the factor . We specify the per-period incomes of the members of the two groups directly as functions of the political states and denote them by y g S P ol t for g 2 fR; P g. 5 Under autocracy, the rich control the government and no redistribution takes place. The income of the rich is y R (A) while that of the poor is y P (A) < y R (A).
Under democracy, the poor hold the majority and use the state to redistribute income from the rich. As a consequence, y R (A) > y R (D) > 0 and y P (A) < y P (D). Finally, in the post-revolutionary regime, the rich fare worse than under democracy while the poor are better o¤. To capture this, we assume that y R (S) = 0 and y P (S) y P (D). The postrevolutionary regime can be interpreted as socialism under which wholesale expropriation of the assets of the rich take place, but it can also be understood simply as another type of 'democracy'where the rules are (particularly) biased in favor of the poor.
The initial political state is autocracy. Regime transitions happen either through a revolution or through democratization. We use the term revolution broadly to mean any form of costly social transformation, whereas democratization is understood as orderly and costless (or less costly) social transformation. The opportunities for a revolution depend 5 These incomes can be derived from more fundamental assumptions about endowments, production technologies, and tax instruments as in Robinson (2000, 2006) . By specifying the incomes directly, we rule out one of the strategies that the rich may use to avoid a revolution: temporary welfare spending. The choice between welfare spending and a franchise extension is vital for understanding why democratization has commitment value, but is less important for understanding our empirical strategy. For this reason, we maintain this assumption, but return to the question of welfare transfers as an alternative to franchise extension in section 4. on the social state (S s t 2 fG; Bg). In social state B, a revolution is impossible, while in social state G, the poor pose a real threat to the rich and may, at a cost, stage a revolution. This results in a transition to the post-revolutionary regime, which we assume is an absorbing state. The cost of a revolution is measured as a fraction of the income of the poor, (1 ) 2 (0; 1), so that the discounted income of a poor citizen after a revolution is y P (S) 1
. To avoid a revolution, the rich can extend the franchise. This is better for them than a revolution and, under the assumption that <
, it can, in fact, prevent a revolution from happening. With this assumption, we can ignore, in the rest of the analysis, the possibility that the poor could, in principle, overthrow a democracy through a revolution.
We assume that the poor observe the social state directly, so they know if a revolution is feasible or not 6 and what the cost is. The rich, on the other hand, do not observe the social state directly. Instead they receive reports about the likely state from two sources: a national and an international source. The national source represents information gathered by the police and the army about home-grown revolutionary activities, news reports about local riots, uprisings and other types of unrest, information about business cycle conditions and so on. The international source represents information received about revolutionary activities abroad. Such activities provide vital information to the rich about the social state and allow them to access the risk of a revolution in their own country better. To formalize this, we assume that at time t the posterior belief of the rich that the social state is G at that time is
with q t 2 (0; 1). The two variables ! N t and ! I t represent national and international reports received at time t by the rich about local and international revolutionary events, respectively. We assume that q t is increasing in both arguments. If no reports are received at all, q t = F (q; ;; ;) = q 2 (0; 1) and if no international reports are received the posterior belief is determined solely by national reports, q t = F q; ! N t ; ; = f q; ! N t . We interpret q as the 'baseline' threat of revolution and notice that since at time t the rich have yet to receive reports for the future ( ! N t+j ; ! I t+j for j = 1; 2...), they believe at time t that q t+j = q for all j = 1; 2::::.
The timing of events within each period is as follows. If a revolution has happened in the past, then the political state is the post-revolutionary regime, and incomes are y g (S)
for g 2 fR; P g. If a franchise extension has happened in the past, the political state is democracy and incomes are y g (D) for g 2 fR; P g. If the political state is autocracy at the beginning of period t (S P ol t = A), then the following sequence of events takes place:
1. The social state S s t 2 fG; Bg is revealed to the poor, but not to the rich. 4. The poor decide whether or not to initiate a revolution. If they do, the society experiences a transition to the post-revolutionary regime (S P ol t = S) and incomes for the period are y g (S) for g 2 fR; P g and the period ends. If no revolution takes place, the society continues to be an autocracy and incomes are y g (A) for g 2 fR; P g and the period ends.
We treat the members of the two groups as two players of a dynamic game and restrict attention to pure strategy Markov perfect equilibria.
Analysis
Suppose that the political state is A. We begin by considering the choice of the poor in stage 4. They know the social state and can base the revolution decision directly on that.
If the social state is B, they do not revolt and the society stays autocratic for the period.
If, on the other hand, the social state is G, they revolt if
We assume that this condition is satis…ed. This implies that the poor will revolt in social state G and the rich must therefore give them voting rights to avoid a revolution. Given that, we can interpret q t as a direct measure of the (perceived) threat of revolution.
Anticipating this in stage 3, the rich decide whether or not to extend the franchise based on the imperfect information about the social state they hold. It is useful …rst to consider the case in which the rich do not receive any reports at all so that q t = q. If the rich decide to extend the franchise, a transition to democracy takes place and their lifetime income is
. If, on the other hand, they decide not to extend the franchise, they face a lottery. Given their assessment of the current threat, q, the expected value of that lottery is q 0 + (1 q) V R where
is the expected discounted value of not extending the franchise in political state A given the 'baseline'threat of revolution. We can solve this equation to get that
We can now de…ne the critical value of the 'baseline' threat of revolution, b q, such that without any reports, the rich are indi¤erent between extending (
) and not extending the franchise ((1 b q) V R ):
For q < b q, the society will -in the absence of any intelligence about the threat of revolution -su¤er a revolution the …rst time the social state is G. Given their prior beliefs about the threat of revolution q, the rich are willing to run the risk and not extend the voting franchise, and a transition to the post-revolutionary regime will eventually happen.
Democratization, accordingly, happens when the rich receive timely intelligence reports.
The following proposition formalizes this logic.
. Let t 0 be the …rst period in which the social state is G. The rich extend the franchise at time t if
and t t 0 . Otherwise, a revolution takes place at time t 0 and the society transits to the post-revolutionary regime.
Proof. See Appendix A
The proposition links intelligence reports from national and international sources to the franchise extension. Reports that induce the rich to update their assessment of the threat of revolution to the critical value q triggers a franchise extension: despite the fact that the reports are not conclusive, the rich judge that the threat at time t is so signi…cant that a revolution is imminent and must be prevented by giving voting rights to the poor.
In the absence of such reports a revolution happens and the society transits to the postrevolutionary regime. In this way, the model demonstrates how shocks to the information set of the rich originating inside and outside the country can cause su¤rage reform and prevent revolution. 7 We shall build our estimation strategy on this, but before we discuss this in detail, it is useful to introduce and motivate our empirical measures of the two key variables: the threat of revolution and the extension of the franchise. 7 Our theory illuminates one possible channel through which international transmission of information a¤ects reform politics at home. This is, however, not the only possible channel through which this could happen. Another possibility is that revolutionary events abroad are focal points for revolutionaries in other countries. To see how this might work, consider the model of information cascades and revolutionary regime transitions developed by Ellis and Fender (2010) . In their model, the (potential) revolutionaries do not know the true cost of revolution, while the governing elites do and can adopt various strategies to preempt revolution, including extending the franchise. Each revolutionary has private information about the cost. Based on this information and on observing what others are doing, each of them decides whether to participate in a revolt. This can create an information cascade and lead to a revolution. Suppose now that a revolutionary event happens in some other country. This could serve as a rally call for the revolutionaries at home, making it more likely that the critical participation level to make a revolution successful would be reached. Realizing this, the governing elites might after observing such a revolutionary event happen in a neighboring country adopt their behavior, and rather than running the risk that a revolution may happen, simply preempt it by extending the franchise.
Data on Revolutionary Events and Franchise Reform
Europe is a natural choice for a test of 'the threat of revolution theory'. During the period from the end of the Napoleonic Wars to the beginning of the Second World War, the major European powers went through the gradual transition from absolute monarchy or other types of autocracy to constitutional democracy. Moreover, Europe was the stage for many of the major revolutionary events of the era and it was the existing governing classes that in the vast majority of cases took the decision to extend the political franchise.
The development of democracy in North America and Oceania followed a very di¤erent path as did the evolution of political institutions in Latin America, Africa and Asia.
It is for this reason that we focus our empirical investigation on a sample of European countries covering the period from 1820 to 1938. Our main sample (the 'western European sample') includes 12 western European countries -Austria, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Germany, the United Kingdom, 8 France, Italy, and Switzerland 9 -for which we have comprehensive data for the entire period. We also study a 'broader European sample'that includes Spain, Portugal, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Serbia, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Romania. For these additional countries, we have much less comprehensive data.
In order to test the 'threat of revolution theory', we need two primary inputs: a quantitative measure of the franchise extension and a quantitative measure of the threat of revolution. Our main interest is to study whether the threat of revolution was a cause of enfranchisement of poorer social groups, as opposed to enfranchisement of, say, women 8 Not including Ireland. 9 For Germany, Austria and Italy, we have excluded the periods with national socialist and fascist regimes, respectively. A country enters the sample when it becomes an independent state. This means that Belgium and the Netherlands enter the sample in 1830; that Switzerland enters in 1848 (when a federal structure was established); that Italy enters in 1861; that Germany enters in 1871. Norway did not gain full independence until 1905. However, during the Union with Sweden, it kept its liberal constitution and independent institutions, except for the foreign service, and could control its franchise rules. Finland was an autonomous Grand Duchy of the Russian Empire from the end of the Finnish War between Sweden and Russia in 1809 until 1917 when full independence was achieved. The old four-chamber Diet was reactivated in the 1860s and made new legislation concerning internal a¤airs. The Diet was replaced by the Parliament of Finland in 1906. This makes it reasonable to include both Norway and Finland in the sample from 1820 but none of our results depend on this choice.
or the young. It is therefore natural to quantify the extension of the voting franchise by tracking the size of the electorate in percentage of its reference age and sex group over time and space. 10 Before women's su¤rage, the reference group is all men of voting age, and after, it is all citizens of voting age. 11 This measure, which we shall call su¤rage, quanti…es on a scale from 0 to 100 the impact of income, property holding, and wealth restrictions on the proportion of the adult population allowed to vote in elections to the main legislative chamber of the country in isolation from the e¤ect of women's su¤rage. 12 It is available for the 12 countries in our main sample only. An alternative way to characterize the process of franchise extension is simply to record the timing of all major franchise extensions.
Information on this can be obtained for 10 additional European countries and allows us to extend the sample with countries in eastern Europe, on the Iberian peninsula and in the Balkans. We record the year of all major su¤rage reforms in column two of Table 1 .
13
Democracy arrived gradually in many of the countries, through a sequence of piecemeal changes, 14 but we note two clusters of reforms: 1848-50 and 1918-19. This is, perhaps, not 10 Our data refer to the right to vote in parliamentary elections and, in countries with bicameral systems, in elections for the lower chamber. 11 This de…nition of democracy identi…es di¤erences in the de jure restrictions on political participation across time and space. These restrictions sometime di¤ered from the de facto restrictions on political in ‡uence. In Germany before 1918, for example, the franchise was fairly wide, but the executive was largely unaccountable to the parliament and, thus, to voters, and in the countryside voting was to a large extent controlled by the landlords. Similarly, in Denmark from 1870 to 1901 the executive branch of government was controlled by a small group of large landowners against the wishes of the majority of the parliament and against (the spirit of) the constitution. By contrast, in Belgium the franchise was fairly narrow till 1893, but the executive was accountable to the electorate. 12 The data are constructed from Flora et al. (1983) , Caramani (2000) , and Cook and Paxton (1998). We assign the value of zero to su¤ rage for the years before the …rst franchise reform allowed national elections to the main legislative body based on a well-de…ned set of su¤rage rules. In some countries these reforms were pre-dated by various elected or appointed advisory bodies. Examples of this include elections for a farmer's chamber in Sweden in the 1820s and in Denmark before the constitution of 1849. In the Netherlands, the su¤rage was quite broad for a while, but was curtailed by the French and reduced under its new royal constitution after the Vienna Congress (see Congleton, 2011) . No quantitative information exists for how broad these su¤rages were, but the historical narrative clearly indicates that they were very narrow and often did not lead to any real in ‡uence on public policy. 13 We continue to focus on reforms that enfranchise lower socioeconomic groups by lowering income and property requirements etc., and do not include reforms that enfranchised women, unless women's su¤rage, as was the case in a number of countries, was part of a broader reform package that also relaxed economic restrictions on the right to vote for men. The reform years are constructed with input from Flora et al. (1983) , Caramani (2000) , Carstairs (1980) , Seymour and Frary (1918) and Encyclopaedia Britannica (1911 Britannica ( , 2009 ).
14 While the transition to full democracy was progressive and gradual in most countries, Italy, Austria and Germany during the interwar period are, of course, examples of backlashes to democracy. In France, a coincidence. In 1848, the Year of Revolution, a revolutionary wave swept over Europe.
The epicenter was France, but social unrest soon spread to the rest of the continent, with revolts in several German and Italian states, in the Habsburg Empire, in Greater Poland and elsewhere. It is well known that the French Revolution of 1848 resulted in su¤rage reforms in France itself, but it is also noteworthy that countries, such as Denmark (1849), Switzerland (1848), the Netherlands (1848) and Belgium (1848), which were not directly a¤ected by the revolutionary wave, extended their franchises at the time. Likewise, the Russian Revolution of 1917 coincides with the second wave of franchise reform.
Our test of the 'threat of revolution theory'is, as discussed above, based on the idea that revolutionary events abroad represent exogenous shocks to the information set of the elites in other countries who used this information to assess the (local) threat level and to judge if a franchise extension was needed or not. To implement this, we have, based on the works by Tilly (1993 Tilly ( , 2004 and Todd (1998) and supplemented with information from Encyclopaedia Britannica, recorded all 'revolutionary events'in Europe during the period. 15 Revolutionary events are de…ned as 'those instances when for a month or more at least two blocs of people backed by armed force and receiving support from a substantial part of the general population exercised control over important segments of the state organization'Tilly (2004, p. 73). 16 We argue i) that information about these events spread around Europe fast and, ii) that the information was, in fact, used by the governing classes in other countries to assess the likelihood of a home-grown revolution. We discuss each of these postulates in turn. Firstly, even in the early part of the 19th century, news did spread fast within Europe. Stuurman the su¤rage was narrowed after the defeat of Napoleon. Similar anti-democratic restrictions were imposed at various points in time in Spain, Poland, and Serbia. 15 Besides revolutionary events that took place in the countries included in the 'broader European sample', we also include events that took place in other countries in the Balkans and in Ireland. 16 Some of the events recorded by Tilly (1993 Tilly ( , 2004 refer to coup d'état and civil war. We have excluded those instances from our analysis in order to focus as closely as possible on situations where the ruling elite was threatened by a revolution as conceptualized in the work by Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) . Other events, such as the riots that took place at the time when the British Parliament deliberated the Great Reform Act in 1831, were too insigni…cant to be counted as a 'revolutionary event' according to Tilly's de…nition. This does not mean that they were not important locally (in terms of our model they would be part of national intelligence), but it does mean that we assume that they were unlikely to have made much of an impression abroad. Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix B detail all the revolutionary events included in our sample, but we have for illustrative purposes singled out the years of the events and recorded them in Table 1 . For the purpose of the statistical analysis, we construct three di¤erent indicators of the threat of revolution as perceived by the governing class of country i in year t (TR k it ). Let R jt be the number of revolutionary events that took place in country j in year t and let D k ij be the 'distance'between country i and country j where k 2 fu; g; lg is an index for particular distance measures. Then, we can de…ne the threat of revolution in country i at time t as
The most elementary indicator, k = u, is just an unweighted sum of the number of revolutionary events in each year, i.e., D u ij = 1 for all i and j with i 6 = j. The two other indicators recognize that events that happened far away from a given country might have had less e¤ect on the perceived threat level than events that happened closer to home. This would be consistent with the theoretical framework developed above. We use two alternative measures of 'distance'. The …rst distance measure, k = g, is geographical distance in kilometers between the capitals of the country pair. The second distance measure, k = l, is linguistic distance. Following Fearon (2003) , we use the number of common branches in the linguistic tree for each pair of countries to measure how closely related their languages are. 18 Arguably, sharing a common language and geographical proximity are both plausible transmission channels for information about revolutionary events. 19 We construct each of the three indicators using the subset of major events indicated with bold face in Table 1 as well as all the events. 20 We stress that we exclude 'national'revolutionary events, i.e., events within a country itself, in all these calculations.
The rationale for doing so is strong. While revolutionary events in other countries are, as argued above, exogenous to the reform politics of neighboring countries, events within a country itself are, by de…nition, related to local politics and could therefore be correlated with unobserved determinants of franchise reform that have nothing to do with the threat of revolution. By excluding these events -e.g. the e¤ect that the revolution in France in 1848 had on France itself -we hope to avoid this problem. 
Estimation Strategy
To introduce our strategy for testing the 'threat of revolution theory', let i denote the index for a particular country and let f it be a measure of the franchise extension (or reform) at time t in country i. We can then express the franchise as a function of the perceived threat of revolution q it , other observable determinants of the franchise X it , country-speci…c …xed e¤ects i , time-speci…c e¤ects t ; and unobserved time-varying determinants of the 18 We use the dominant language group, except for Switzerland and Belgium where we base the calculation on a population weighted average. The linguistic tree contains up to 15 nested categories and D ; where #common ij is the number of common branches in the tree between the language of country i and j.
19 One could also consider using some measure of economic proximity, such as the extent of bilateral trade. For most countries, we can only trace this variable back to 1870. This alternative is therefore impractical for our purpose. 20 The reason for zooming in on the major events is that some of the minor events might not have been widely noted at the time in other countries and so should be given zero weight.
franchise it :
Motivated by the model presented in section 2, we approximate the perceived threat of revolution in country i at time t by a linear equation:
where i is the country-speci…c baseline threat and t represents common shifts in the threat level that a¤ect all countries at the same time, e.g., the 'ghost of revolution' or 'rally calls'. Combining these two equations, we get
In practice, we do not observe the national intelligence reports and they become part of the error term. We can write equation (10) as
. This is the equation that we take to the data. To estimate the causal e¤ect of the threat of revolution on the franchise, i.e., the parameter , it must be true that our empirical proxy for ! I it , conditional on the (other) observable determinants of the franchise included in the vector X it (to be discussed below) and on country and time …xed e¤ects, is uncorrelated with all unobserved determinants of the franchise, i.e. that cov(" it ; ! I it X it ; ' i ; t ) = 0. This, in turn, requires (1) that the error term it is (conditionally) uncorrelated with ! it is di¢ cult to do so -the extent to which these strategies were used become part of it . 21 As we discuss below, there are other theories of franchise extension (e.g. modernization and enlightenment, war, and trade integration) than those based on rivalry within the elite, which are also unrelated to the threat of revolution. However, we are able to control for each of these in the estimations and so, they are less likely to show up in the error term. 22 Although it is possible that some domestic political factions would have an incentive to block news about revolutionary events abroad to further domestic political ends, it is virtually impossible to imagine that this could be done e¤ectively in the European countries in the sample. In contrast, it is interesting to note that this did in fact happen throughout the Caribbean following the Haitian Revolution. This was made possible by strong social control and low levels of literacy. 23 The drawback of this coping strategy is that it is only credible when the threat of revolution is real (in the model when the social state is G). For this reason, it will often be insu¢ cient to head o¤ a revolution and the rich must resort to franchise reform.
Our estimate of will then be biased down towards zero.
We also require that the correlation between national and international intelligence reports is zero. Unconditionally, this is unlikely to be the case. In fact, our causal mechanism -international transmission of information about the risk of revolution -presumes that the elite of one country can learn about the risk of a home-grown revolution by observing revolutionary events abroad. This requires (positive) cross-country correlation between factors that make revolutions likely or not (in the model between the social states). If we, moreover, presume that national and international reports about revolutionary activities are more likely to emerge when there really is a risk of revolution, national and international reports will, ceteris paribus, tend to be (positively) correlated. If unchecked, this creates upward bias in the estimate of , and it is therefore important that we condition on the factors that generate this correlation in order to ensure that ! The most important factor that could cause such a correlation is the business cycle.
If, for example, the business cycle contains an international component and the threat or revolution is systematically related to economic hardship, then the conditions for revolution would be (positively) correlated across countries. This, in turn, means that national intelligence reports would be correlated with the international business cycle which, in turn, may be a driver of revolutionary activities abroad. In practice, we deal with this concern by controlling for local business cycle conditions, both directly by conditioning on variables related to the state of the national trade cycle and indirectly by including common time …xed e¤ects in the estimations.
The 'rally call e¤ect'is another factor that could generate a positive correlation between national and international reports about the threat of revolution. Suppose, for example, that a revolutionary event happens in some country. This is observed by revolutionaries abroad for whom it serves as a rally call, thus making revolution more likely there. As a consequence, national intelligence reports about the risk of revolution may reach the local elite. This phenomenon, however, is captured by the common time …xed e¤ects in equation (9) and is, we believe, less of a concern.
With this discussion in mind, we estimate two versions of equation (11) 
The Dynamic Panel Model
In the dynamic panel model, the dependent variable is su¤rage and, as the baseline, we consider the following speci…cation:
where ' i is a country …xed e¤ect (for each of the 12 countries in the western European sample), t is a time …xed e¤ect and " it is an error term with E (" it ) = 0. In the baseline speci…cation, we use two-year time …xed e¤ects rather than yearly time dummies to avoid a multicollinearity problem, but we return to this issue below. 24 The vector X it 5 includes other potential determinates of the su¤rage, typically lagged by …ve years (to be discussed below). To capture the strong path dependency in the evolution of franchise institutions, we include a lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side.
The evolution of the voting franchise is likely to be a¤ected by many factors other than the threat of revolution. We include as many of these as possible in the vector X. 25 Firstly, the modernization hypothesis, as formulated by, for example, Lipset (1960) , stresses the gradual increase in income, improvement in education attainment, and the process of urbanization as major causes of democratization. We control for these factors by including GDP per capita, the urbanization rate, and a dummy variable, educational attainment, that is equal to one once enrollment in primary education surpasses 60 per cent and zero before then. Secondly, Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2008) and others have argued that trade 24 The problem is that the year …xed e¤ects are (almost) perfectly collinear with the three indicators of the threat of revolution. 25 The precise de…nitions of all control variables and their sources are given in Appendix B. In the baseline speci…cations, we only include variables for which we have data covering the entire sample period from 1820. In extensions, we add a number of other variables for which we only have partial coverage. We postpone the discussion of these other variables to section 7. integration causes democratization. In the baseline speci…cations, we control for this by including a dummy variable, gold standard, that is equal to one if a country is on the gold standard and zero otherwise. The idea is that being on the gold standard reduces trading costs and indirectly encourages trade integration. We acknowledge that this is an imperfect proxy. Its main virtue is that it, in contrast to more direct measures of trade integration considered in Section 7, can be tracked back to 1820. Thirdly, the size of the country may matter. One reason, suggested by Mulligan and Shleifer (2005) , is that a larger population means that there are more shoulders to bear the …xed cost associated with institutional innovations. Consequently, more populous countries should be more inclined to adopt franchise reforms with large …xed costs. To control for this, we include a measure of the size of the population (population). All these control variables are lagged by …ve years to reduce the risk of simultaneity bias. for such spillover e¤ects, we include the following measure of social learning in the model:
where D k ij is either the distance in kilometers from country i to country j (k = g) or the linguistic distance between the two (k = l) and DEM jt counts the total number of franchise reforms undertaken by country j by year t. If social learning was important, we should …nd a positive coe¢ cient to this variable.
Evidence from the Dynamic Panel Model
The main results of the panel model are reported in Table 2 .
27 Columns one to three in Table 2 show the results for the three di¤erent measures of the threat of revolution when equation (12) is estimated with a …xed e¤ects estimator. 28 In all speci…cations, the threat of revolution is signi…cant at the …ve percent level or better. Not surprisingly, the e¤ect is smaller, but still statistically signi…cant, when we use the broadest de…nition of what constitutes a revolutionary event (see column four). The presence of the lagged dependent variable on the right-hand side, however, implies that the …xed e¤ects estimator is biased, albeit the bias is likely to be very small since our panel covers more than 100
years. 29 The bias can be avoided by using the GMM-system estimator 30 (Blundell and Bond, 1998) or the bias-corrected least-squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator (Bruno, 2005) . Very similar results emerge when the model is estimated using these estimators (see columns …ve to eight). Overall, we therefore conclude that the threat of revolution was a statistically signi…cant and, we argue, a causal determinant of the franchise extension in western Europe. The magnitude of the e¤ect can best be grasped by considering the point estimate from column one of Table 2 ; which reports the speci…cation with the unweighted measure of the threat. The short-run e¤ect of an 'extra'revolutionary event somewhere in Europe is that it increases the franchise by just under two percentage points in the average country. The high degree of persistence in the franchise, however, implies that the long-run e¤ect is much larger: around 33 percentage points.
The estimations shown in Table 2 do not make any attempt to control for three factors 27 We postpone the discussion of evidence on competing theories to section 7. 28 We allow for panel heteroskedasticity and for spatial correlations between the error terms across countries, and we base inference on panel corrected standard errors (PCSEs), as recommended by Beck and Katz (1995) . 29 For a …xed number of countries, the bias disappears in the limit as the number of time periods goes to in…nity. In practice, however, Judson and Owen (1999) have shown that the bias is negligible for panels that cover more than 20 years. 30 With only 12 countries, it is not clear, however, that a GMM estimator is preferable to the …xed e¤ects estimator.
that the Acemoglu and Robinson's (2000) theory of su¤rage reform highlights as being important: business cycle shocks, repression of revolutionary activities, and temporary transfers to the poor. Table 3 shows some speci…cations that take these factors into account. Firstly, we have constructed a measure of the business cycle, cycle, by extracting the cyclical component of GDP per capita using a Hodrick-Prescott …lter. 31 Since riots and other types of social unrest typically build up during times of hardship, we expect that the governing classes revised their estimate of the likelihood of a revolution upwards during a recession making su¤rage reform more likely then and vice versa. A speci…cation including cycle (and the trend component of GDP per capita, trend) is shown in column one of Table   3 . We see that controlling for the state of the cycle reduces, as one would expect if the cycle is negatively correlated with threat of revolution and positively correlated across countries, the size of the point estimate on T R g it but not its signi…cance. The e¤ect of cycle itself is insigni…cant.
Secondly, if the elites could prevent a revolution through repression or by o¤ering temporary transfers to the poor, it would, according to Acemoglu and Robinson's (2000) theory, be preferred to a (permanent) extension of the franchise. As discussed above, failure to control for this biases the estimate of the threat of revolution downwards. As a proxy for 'repression', we use data on the share of the public budget spent on policing and defence (repression) and as a measure of 'temporary transfers' we use the share of the public budget spent on health, education, housing and various government-sponsored insurance and welfare programs (temporary transfers). The results are reported in columns two and three of Table 3 . Despite the fact that the sample size is signi…cantly reduced, the threat of revolution continues to have a highly signi…cant and positive e¤ect on the franchise. The point estimates on repression and temporary transfers are negative as predicted by the theory but not statistically signi…cant. Table 3 shows three further speci…cations. Firstly, the baseline speci…cations assume 31 We have tried a number of other …lters. It makes no di¤erence to the results which one is being used. 32 We have re-estimated the speci…cations without including the two variables repression and temporary transfers on the restricted sample to judge the size of the potential downwards bias. We …nd that the coe¢ cient to T R g is 1.95 (compared to 1.98) for the 'repression sample', whereas it is 1.33 (compared to 1.33) for the 'temporary transfers sample'. These point estimates suggest that the bias induced by not being able to control for these alternative coping strategies in the main speci…cations is very small.
that international news about revolutionary events abroad reached the governing classes in other countries within a year. As discussed in detail above, the historical evidence supports this assumption. Yet, it is important to check the robustness of the results by allowing for a longer window of opportunity. The speci…cation shown in column four lags T R g it by one year and thus allows for a two-year window. The point estimate is 0:99 as compared to 1:22 with a one-year window, but still signi…cant at the …ve percent level.
Secondly, since all countries in the western European sample, with the exception of the United Kingdom and France, did not have regular elections by 1820 (su¤rage is coded zero) and all countries had universal male su¤rage towards the end of the sample period (su¤rage is coded 100), the dependent variable, su¤rage, is censored. In column …ve of Table 3 , we show what happens when we use a Tobit estimator to take this into account.
We see that it does not make much di¤erent to the results. Thirdly, our measures of the threat of revolution are serially correlated by construction. This can, as pointed out by Bertrand et al. (2004) , generate a spurious correlation, in our case, between su¤rage and T R k it . To see if this is a problem, we show in column six a speci…cation that clusters the error terms at the country level. Again, we see that it does not make much of a di¤erence. There are three other issues -related to identi…cation, to common time e¤ects, and to stationarity -that are su¢ ciently important to warrant detailed considered before we present the results from the event history study.
Decomposing the Variation in the Threat of Revolution The variation in the (weighted) measures of the threat of revolution comes from three sources: …rstly, over time variation; secondly, cross-country variation due to the fact that we omit revolutionary events happening within a country itself; and thirdly cross-country variation generated by di¤erences in geographical or linguistic distance to the epicenter of each revolutionary event. The variation created by excluding national revolutionary events is non-random. 33 Since only France is a¤ected by own revolutionary events in the 'western European sample', we can confront the non-randomness generated in this way simply by dropping France from the sample. Doing so, makes no di¤erence to the results [not reported].
More importantly, we can disentangle the two remaining sources of variation by postulating that
The …rst term picks up the over-time variation in the threat level (and we expect that e > 0). This may, in the absence of year …xed e¤ects, be confounded by simultaneous movements in political unrest and franchise extension (see below). The second term isolates the cross-country variation generated by di¤erences in distance to the events. This source of variation is unquestionably exogenous and we expect that e < 0. Re-estimating the partial adjustment model with g T R 
We see that the signs are as expected and that both sources of variation are contributing to the identi…cation of the e¤ect of the threat of revolution. The fact that the estimate of e , which is identi…ed purely from the cross-country variation generated by distance to revolutionary events, is negative and statistically signi…cant is a strong indication that we have identi…ed a causal mechanism.
Common Time Fixed E¤ects
We are aware that the results reported in Tables 2 and   3 could be interpreted as evidence of a simultaneous over-time change in revolutionary mood -the 'ghost of revolution'-and franchise extension, rather than as a causal e¤ect of revolutionary threat. It is also possible that a sudden spur of 'enlightenment'in a particular 33 Countries that experience a revolutionary event are coded as being exposed to lower revolutionary threat in that year than the rest of the countries. To the extent that revolutionary events within a country are correlated with su¤rage reform, this creates a spurious correlation between the three measures of the threat of revolution and su¤ rage. If the correlation is positive, the consequence is a downwards bias. 34 The control variables are the same as in the speci…cations reported in Table 2 , but to conserve space, we do not report the point estimates here. Robust standard errors are reported in the bracket under the coe¢ cient.
year across all the countries in the sample could reduce the threat of a revolution and simultaneously trigger su¤rage reforms. The time …xed e¤ects are included to address this concern. However, since we use two-year average time e¤ects to avoid a multicollinearity problem, it is possible that 'ghost of revolution' or 'enlightenment' shocks could play a role if within a two-year period there happened to be more revolutionary events and more su¤rage reforms in the second than in the …rst year. To investigate this further, we adopt the method of Plümper and Troeger (2007) to estimate the time e¤ects separately from the impact of our measure of the threat of revolution. In particular, we, …rst, estimate a speci…cation of equation (12) with one-year time …xed e¤ects but without WWI and T R 
We do not report the coe¢ cients for the control variables (which are the same as in Table   2 ) and the standard errors are shown in brackets under the coe¢ cient estimates. The estimated e¤ect of T R u it and T R g it are somewhat smaller than before while the e¤ect of T R l it is a little larger, but all estimates continue to be highly signi…cant. However, for WWI the e¤ect is more dramatic. In fact, the variable changes sign from negative to positive suggesting that common time …xed e¤ects are more of an issue when evaluating the 'Janowitz thesis'than the 'threat of revolution theory'.
Stationarity Su¤rage as well as several of the control variables are trending up and may be or behave as if they were non-stationary. 35 This raises questions regarding the interpretation of the results reported in Tables 2 and 3 . To confront this issue, we estimate an Error Correction Model for su¤rage, using OLS with panel corrected standard errors, as suggested by Beck (2001) . In particular, we estimate
where the term in parenthesis is the long-run relation appropriately adjusted to match our other estimations and the parameter e captures the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium.
The estimated equation is 36 su¤rage it = 1:38 :: :
Again, we have suppressed the control variables (which are the same as in Table 2 ) and only report results for T R g it . The coe¢ cients reported in equation (20) are all signi…cant at the one percent level. The equation implies a positive short-run e¤ect of changes in the threat of revolution on changes in su¤rage. More importantly, we …nd a substantial long-run e¤ect. The negative estimate of e implies adjustment to the long-run equilibrium.
All in all, this suggests that our results are not an artifact of non-stationary data.
Event History Model
The variable su¤rage records the size of the electorate and allows us to study the gradual evolution of the franchise over time and space. An alternative approach is to record and study the timing of major franchise reforms. One advantage of this shift in emphasis is that we can then extend the sample with countries from Eastern Europe, the Iberian peninsula and the Balkans.
To facilitate such an event history study, we code, using the information from Table 1 , the dependent variable y it as 1 if country i introduced a franchise reform in year t and as 0 in the years before and after that. A country drops out of the sample in the year after universal male su¤rage was reached or if it regressed into dictatorship. We do not know precisely when a country became at 'risk'of becoming democratic. So we deal with the problem of left censoring by assuming that countries enter the 'risk set'either in 1820 or at 36 The …gures in brackets underneath the coe¢ cients are robust standard errors.
the time of independence. These data are grouped duration data. It is, therefore, natural to use a duration model to estimate the relationship between the threat of revolution and the time conditional probability of su¤rage reform (the hazard rate). We follow Beck et al. (1998) and estimate the following discrete logistic model:
where X it is the vector of control variables (chosen from among those discussed above).
The variable M t 1 is an indicator variable that is equal to 0 in each year before universal male su¤rage and equal to 1 thereafter. We allow for duration dependence in the hazard rate through the function H (:). 
The ' Western European Sample'
We begin by reporting results based on the 'western European sample'. 38 We control for the same co-variates as before. The main results paint the same picture as that emerging from the dynamic panel model: the threat of revolution increased the probability of su¤rage reform signi…cantly. The …rst four columns of Table 4 show the logit estimates for each of the measures of the threat of revolution. We see that they all are positive and statistically signi…cant at the …ve percent level or better. The magnitude of the e¤ect can be illustrated by considering the odds ratio. Based on the estimate reported in column one of Table 4 , one extra revolutionary event increases the odds that a country will introduce a major su¤rage reform in that year by 108 percent. This is a substantial e¤ect.
These estimations, however, do not take into account that democratizations are rare events. 39 The fact that they are may magnify any systematic bias of the reported maximum likelihood estimates. King and Zeng (2001) have developed an estimator that corrects for 37 The argument of the function is t t p i where t p i represents either the year in which country i enters the 'risk set'(i.e., either 1820 or the year of independence) or the year of the previous franchise reform within the sample period. We estimate H (:) using natural cubic splines and use the estimated spline coe¢ cients along with the cumulation of years since the last reform (or since entry to the sample) to model duration dependence. We have determined the number of knots by a sequence of F-tests and have settled on a speci…cation with two knots. 38 Germany and Switzerland cannot be included in the event history study because they introduced full male su¤rage at the time they became nation states. 39 In the 'western European sample', years with su¤rage reform constitute less than four percent of the total number of cases. this bias. We have re-estimated all the models using this estimator and report the results of one of these re-estimations in column …ve. We see that the coe¢ cient on T R g it continues to be statistically signi…cant at the one percent level. The same is true with the other measures of the threat of revolution [not reported]. Another limitation of the logit model is that the baseline hazard rate, while admitting duration dependency as discussed above, 40 does not include a country-speci…c component. In column one of Table 5 , we report the results from a speci…cation in which the baseline hazard rate is a¤ected by idiosyncratic country-speci…c shocks. A comparison between the estimates from this random e¤ects logit model and those reported in Table 4 reveals very little di¤erence. Table 5 also reports speci…cations that allow for clustering of the standard errors at the country level, control for the cyclic component of GDP, spending on repression and temporary transfers or allow for a one-year delay in the ‡ow of information. In all cases, the threat of revolution continues to be a signi…cant predictor of the timing of franchise reforms. 
The ' Broader European Sample'
All the countries in the main sample are western European and in actual fact achieved universal manhood su¤rage within the sample period. In other parts of Europe, in particular in eastern Europe, on the Balkans, and on the Iberian peninsula, the evolution of democracy was more sporadic and many of these countries did not become fully consolidated democracies until the third wave of democratization. Yet, they did take the …rst steps towards democracy by extending the franchise to broader segments of the populations before World War I or just after, following a pattern not all that dissimilar to that followed in western Europe. Seymour and Frary (1918: pp. 151-152), for example, note about Russia in 1905 that 'by these extensions [of the franchise], the right to vote was given to the vast majority of the people'. Although, voting continued to be indirect and subject to o¢ cial control, this did constitute a signi…cant broadening of political participation.
Spain extended the franchise gradually over the course of the 19th century and arrived at universal male su¤rage by 1890 (Ortega and Blanco, 1990 ). On the Balkans, Greece had a relatively democratic constitution from 1844 onwards, while Serbia had a parliament (Skupshtina) from 1869, which was elected by universal su¤rage, whose only aristocratic element consisted of a certain number of deputies appointed by the prince (Seymour and Frary, 1918, pp. 251-252) . A further franchise reform took place in 1888. Bulgaria was created after the Russian-Turkish war (1877-78) with semi-democratic institutions based on universal manhood su¤rage but with signi…cant powers vested in the King. Romania had a very restricted franchise throughout the 19th century but introduced a manhood su¤rage subject to a literacy test in 1918. Consequently, seen from the perspective of the 19th century, it is not so clear that our sample of western European countries is systematically di¤erent from the 'full'European sample. Nevertheless, it is important to subject the 'threat of revolution theory'to a test based on a broader sample of countries.
To this end, we have, as noted above, collected information on su¤rage reforms in Spain, Portugal, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Serbia, Hungary, Poland, Russia and Romania (see Table 1 ) and re-estimated the event history model on this broader sample of countries. 41 The down-side is that we are unable to control for competing theories of franchise reform, except for the in ‡uence of war, and, in a few countries, for GDP per capita and population. The results are shown in Table 6 . The …rst four columns report the results for the maximum sample of 20 countries, while the last four columns report speci…cations with additional control variables, but without Russia, Serbia, Iceland, and Luxembourg. Looking across the two top rows of the table, we see that all measures of the threat of revolution have a positive and highly statistically signi…cant impact on the likelihood of su¤rage reform. The historical narrative clearly demonstrates that repression was common currency in Russia and eastern Europe. Since we are not controlling for this in the estimations reported in Table 6 , we expect a downwards bias in the estimate of the threat of revolution e¤ect. It is, therefore, not overly surprising that the estimated e¤ects are smaller in magnitude than those reported for the western European sample in Table   4 . In conclusion, our results suggest that the threat of revolution was a major impulse of democratization not only within western Europe narrowly de…ned, but in Europe more widely.
[ Table 6 : Results from the Event History Model III.
Estimates of the probability of a su¤rage reform, 1820-1938, 'Broader European Sam-
ple']
Other Results
Our main purpose is to test the 'threat of revolution theory'. However, our empirical investigation can also speak to the relevance of competing theories of su¤rage reform.
Some of the alternative theories require us to augment the baseline models estimated on the western European sample with additional variables for which we only got partial time or country coverage. The results of these additional estimations are reported in Tables 7 and 8. We notice that in all these additional speci…cations the evidence supporting the 'threat of revolution theory'remains strong and so, in what follows, we focus our discussion on the evidence related to the competing theories.
The 'Janowitz thesis'that war and the emergence of conscription armies were important impulses for democratic reform in Europe receives some support. In the panel model, the coe¢ cient on war is consistently positive and highly signi…cant. Based on the point estimates reported in columns one to four in Table 2 , being at war, ceteris paribus, increases the franchise by between 3.5 and 4.2 percentage points in the short-run, with the long-run e¤ect being about 17 times larger. The e¤ect is, however, not signi…cant in the event history study (see, e.g., Table 4 ). It is interesting to notice that WWI, according to our estimates, by itself did not contribute signi…cantly to the extension of the franchise in Europe. In the panel model, this may, however, be due to the high correlation with the two-year time e¤ects. This suspicion is con…rmed when we estimate the time e¤ects using the method suggested by Plümper and Troeger (2007) . In this case, the e¤ect of WWI falls into line with the 'Janowitz thesis'showing a positive and sometimes signi…cant e¤ect on the franchise extension (see equations (16) to (18) 43 It is a problem for both of these measures that we lose between 200 and 650 observations. As can be seen from column one of Table 7 , trade volume is signi…cant in the panel model, but insigni…cant in the event history model (see column one of Table 8 ). Both speci…cations, however, show the expected positive sign, giving some credence to the 'trade-causes-democracy'thesis. The measure of trade costs based on the wheat price spread is insigni…cant.
In contrast to Persson and Tabellini (2009), we …nd no evidence that being located in a 'democratic neighborhood'encourages democracy. On the contrary, in the few cases where the variable social learning is statistically signi…cant, it has a negative sign, suggesting democratic reforms in neighboring countries had a negative e¤ect on democratic reforms at home. Occasionally, population size has a positive and signi…cant impact.
None of the modernization variables, i.e. GDP per capita, urbanization rate and education attainment, seem to have mattered much. In the few cases in which a modernization variable is signi…cant it appears to have a negative e¤ect on democracy. The same message comes from the speci…cations shown in Tables 7 and 8 where we control for agricultural share to capture the impact of industrialization. 44 This is not encouraging for 'modernization theory'. We do acknowledge, however, that it is a challenge to estimate the impact of slow moving social processes on discrete events like su¤rage reforms and that more research is needed on this and on the related question of the link between trade integration and democracy.
We believe that western Europe during the 19th century constitutes a promising testing ground for doing so. It would also be of interest to delve deeper into the question of social learning and democratization.
9 Appendix A Proof of proposition 1. Let q t be the updated threat level in period t. The rich get
if they extend the franchise. If they do not extend, then their expected income is
where we have used the fact that q < b q; so that the rich given their assessment of the 'baseline'threat of revolution q do not expect to extend the franchise in the future. Rearranging gives equation (6) . The critical value q < 1 for all q < b q. To see this, evaluate q at b q to get 
Notice that @q @q = y R (D) (1 )y R (A) < 0 and that q for q = 0 is positive. If the rich receive reports that induce them to update their assessment of the threat of revolution to q t q at t t 0 ; a transition to democracy takes place, otherwise a revolution will cause a transition to the post-revolutionary regime.
Appendix B
The variables used in the analysis are de…ned as follows: 47 1. Su¤rage is the electorate in percentage of the enfranchised age and sex group; before the women's su¤rage, male population only (parliamentary elections). Sources: Flora et al. (1983) , Caramani (2000) , and Cook and Paxton (1998).
TR
k it is the measure of the threat of revolution. For k = u it is a simple count of the events in a given year; for k = g the events are weighted by geographic distance; 47 For notes on the construction of the data set see Aidt and Jensen (2009b Robust z statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All estimations include two-year average time fixed effects. in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Constant term not reported. Only ten countries are included in the event history study as Germany and Switzerland had full male suffrage from the time they became unified countries. All estimations allow for duration dependence of the hazard rate. in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Only ten countries are included in the event history study as Germany and Switzerland had full male suffrage from the time they became unified countries. All estimations allow for duration dependence of the hazard rate and include the same control variables as in Table 4 . a. Data from Austria are missing. b. Log GDP per capita is replaced by cycle and trend. Table 2 and we only report the new variables. a. Data from Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland are missing; b. Gold standard is replaced by the alternative measure of trade integration. Table 2 and allow for duration dependency. We only report the new variables. a. Data from Belgium are lost. a. Data from Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, and Sweden are missing. c. Gold standard is replaced by the alternative measure of trade integration.
